<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>HPKE on CE Labs</title><link>https://celabs.eu/tags/hpke/</link><description>Recent content in HPKE on CE Labs</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://celabs.eu/tags/hpke/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Post-Quantum HPKE</title><link>https://celabs.eu/blog/pq-hpke/</link><pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://celabs.eu/blog/pq-hpke/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The IETF is working on &lt;a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-hpke-pq-05" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;post-quantum security for HPKE&lt;/a&gt;
,
the scheme used in protocols like TLS ECH, MLS, and Oblivious HTTP.
We&amp;rsquo;ve implemented the draft: it runs today in hpke-rs, part of &lt;a href="https://github.com/celabshq/libcrux" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;libcrux&lt;/a&gt;
, and
you can try it live in the demo further down this post.
This post covers what changes on the way to post-quantum HPKE, and why the
transition may not be a drop-in.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>